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1. Introduction
The 2007 global nancial crisis highlighted the absence of established crisis resolution
mechanisms and thus is changing the perception of the role of nancial regulations around the
world. Regulators are now widely considered responsible for managing crises and proposing
optimal bailout policies in a manner that does not aggravate systemic risk. It is necessary and
urgent to evaluate the impacts of bail-out guarantees taken by governments for the purpose
of preventing the future collapse of the banking system. This paper, therefore, examines
whether regulatory interventions had a signicantly ameliorating eect on the spillover from
a distressed bank to the nancial market.
What can we learn from Japanese nancial crisis in the 1990s and the early 2000s? Our
study on how regulatory interventions aect systemic risk in Japan is important for a few
reasons. First, Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) witnessed that almost the policy reactions to the
crisis employed by the U.S. government during the global nancial crisis that were borne from
Japan. Dierent from the nancial crisis 2007-2009 in the U.S., the Japanese nancial system
experienced a longer period of continuing crisis, therefore providing rich evidence that can
be a good stage for analyzing regulatory interventions for managing a crisis. Consequently,
this study focuses on four types of interventions: public fund injection (abbreviated as PFI)
programs; prompt corrective actions (PCA); failure resolution scheme (FRS); and deposit
insurance reforms (DIR) act. To analyze regulatory interventions during the crisis, we use
manually collected Japanese bank-level data to create an original comprehensive dataset on
crisis resolution.
Second, recently, the post{global nancial crisis has highlighted the need to analyze how
nancial intermediaries' behaviors are aected by nancial regulation systematically, there-
fore, several systemic risk indexes have been proposed in the literature (Adrian and Brun-
nermeier 2016, Acharya et al. 2017, Huang et al. 2009, Lehar 2005, Billio et al. 2012, De
Jonghe 2010). The characteristics of regulatory regimes are the predominant reasons behind
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a surge in global systemic risk, hence, we add to the scarce literature on how government
bailout plans for the future crisis should be arranged.
Finally, Liu (2014) attracts the attention on the existence of systemic risk in Japan since
extreme downside risk of the Japanese market is transmitted to the majority of Asian-Pacic
markets when such a regionally dominant stock market switches into high volatility periods.
In such a concern, understanding systemic risk in Japan is of importance for risk management
and policy implications to prevent the possibility of extreme losses in Asia-Pacic markets
and reduce the instability in the economy.
This paper makes contributions to dierent strands of literature. First, the literature
provides a prediction that the regulatory interventions work primarily through liquidity pro-
vision to the nancial system (Allen and Gale 2000, Freixas et al. 2000, Diamond and Rajan
2005). Our evidence that PFI, PCA, and DIR reduce systemic risk mostly complements this
theoretical hypothesis that the liquidity provision works, contributing to the growing litera-
ture on systemic risk (Reboredo and Ugolini 2015, Girardi and Ergun 2013, Lopez-Espinosa
et al. 2012).
Second, conrming the conjecture on moral hazard in government guarantee literature
(Cordella and Yeyati 2003, Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007, 2008), we demonstrate that simple
and intuitive rescue schemes outperform massive scheme in preventing systemic risk. Our
ndings show that the simple regulatory policy reduced systemic risk whereas the massive
rescue package for the fteen largest banks increased it. In line with the argument of Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008), our analysis provides the insight that the Japanese regulators
suered from a \too-many-to-fail" problem in their attempts of avoiding the continuation of
bank losses in the 1990s.
Third, our study is the rst to provide a novel nding that the government bailout has
external eects on systemic risk. As suggested by Allen and Gale (2000), capital infusion
has a direct spillover eect on the recipient and external eect on other banks given that
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there is an interbank linkage in the bank-centred system. With an attempt of investigating
these two channels in PFI, we nd that the simple government bailout package enhanced
nancial stability via the external channel but not the direct spillover channel. In other
words, the external ameliorating eect on non-recipient banks exists, but no greater eect
does on the recipient bank itself than that of non-recipient banks. In contrast, the massive
PFI program increased systemic risk, adding a clearer evidence on too-many-to-fail literature
that the banking system would be in a danger of further systemic disruption through direct
exposure and interbank linkage.
Fourth, we contribute Japanese evidence to the literature on PCA (Chernykh and Cole
2015, Aggarwal and Jacques 2001, Benston and Kaufman 1997). The regulatory responses
should provide a better move towards liquidity provision and thus prevent systemic disruption
in the country characterized as a bank-centred nancial system like Japan.
Section 2 reviews the characteristics of the nancial crisis in Japan and relates them to
the literature on regulatory policies and systemic risk. Section 3 describes the empirical
methodology for systemic risk estimation and data sample. Section 4 provides the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. A brief outline on the Japanese nancial crisis and regulatory policies
To begin with, it is helpful to outline the Japanese nancial crisis and what measures the
government has taken. The aim of this section is to smoothly lead the reader to the Japanese
nancial crisis and to relate the characteristics to the existing literature. The reader who is
more interested in the Japanese nancial crisis should refer to Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003)
and Shimizu (2006, 2009). Briey speaking, the nancial institutions suered huge damages
in the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1993, the amount of nonperforming loans
was 12.8 trillion yen, which was 3.5% of total loans. It increased to 42.0 trillion yen (8.9%)
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by 2002, which was the highest record during the Japanese nancial crisis. 1 The stock price
index of banking industry became 20% in 2002 relative to 1995. The government paid 25
trillion yen to stabilize the nancial system during the period from 1993 to 2004.
After the government took several types of measures quite frequently and intensively, the
nancial system nally recovered stability around 2004. As is well-known, the features of
crisis such as successive bank failures and those of government interventions are in common
with other crises like the global nancial crisis in the U.S. and Europe. In our opinions, we
can learn suggestive lessons from the Japanese nancial crisis which provides the common
resources for the research in this area together with those researches regarding the global
nancial crisis.
Japan is characterized as a bank-centred nancial system because it has a weak bond
market and rms are dependent on bank lending. The Japanese economy is considered as
a world-beater in the 1980s and early 1990s. As problem loans dramatically mounted by
the mid-1990s, many banks turned out to be undercapitalized or unhealthy (Hanazaki and
Horiuchi 2003). Adequacy capitalization is a crucial condition for bank lending (Brei et
al. 2013). Nevertheless, the bank-centred system does not have the strong capital market to
immediately raise liquidity, hence, the regulatory intervention is a visible solution to stabilize
the banking system.
Our research departs from the intersection of strands of literature on crisis resolution,
liquidity provision, and systemic risk. As reasoned by Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012), liquid-
ity strains are regarded as the main contributor behind systemic risk. Being aware of the
problems on an increasing amount of bank irrecoverable loans, in turn, capital shortages, a
number of bailout policies were introduced in Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s. The
following four subsections provide the information on regulatory interventions in the context
of Japanese crisis, discussing the relation of each policy to the related literature.
1Compared to GDP, the nonperforming loans amounts to 8.2% in 2002.
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2.1. Public fund injection (PFI)
The PFI programs allow banks to reinforce equity capital and provide liquidity to the
nancial system and the recipient bank. The regulator oered new PFI programs several
times during our sample period. Among these programs, the largest program was introduced
in 1999. In this program, the fteen largest banks that were considered relatively healthy but
that had substantial inuence over the systemic risk applied for the reinforcement of equity
capital. The second largest PFI program was introduced in September 1999. Four relatively
weak regional banks reinforced their equity capital. Subsequently, one or a few banks applied
simultaneously for the PFI program. The total numbers of approvals are thirteen during the
sample period.
The previous literature on regulatory interventions argues that the measure of resolution
works primarily through liquidity provision to the nancial system. The provision of liquidity
not only decreases a probability of default of the recipients of PFI, but also has an eect
of decreasing a probability of bank runs and lowering systemic risk (Liu et al. 2013, Allen
and Gale 2000, Freixas et al. 2000, Diamond and Rajan 2005). In addition, a bailout
package provides the public with an implicit guarantee by certifying that the recipients
are healthy, helps to reduce information asymmetries related to nancial distress costs, and
restores condence (Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2012, Veronesi and Zingales 2010). Therefore,
PFI aimed at rescuing distressed too-big-to-fail banks.
2.2. Prompt corrective actions (PCA)
The government introduced a rule-based PCA scheme in 1998, which requires early inter-
vention on a timely basis when a bank's capitalization is still positive but under-capitalized.
For example, the regulator orders banks to recapitalize, suspend dividends, restrict asset
growth, and prohibit some or all activities (Benston and Kaufman 1997). 2 These amend-
2The scheme of PCA in Japan is similar to that of U.S., which was reviewed by Benston and Kaufman
(1997).
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ments decrease a probability of bank default and lower systemic risk. Under an announcement
of PCA, a bank tends to recapitalize quickly under threat of early closure (Dahl and Spivey
1995). Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) document that banks signicantly reduce their level
of credit risk in response to PCA. Strengthened capital base indeed reduces systemic risk.
Thus, we predict that the PCA has the same role of stabilizing nancial system as the PFI.
2.3. Failure resolution scheme (FRS)
When a bank nally fails, deposit insurance resolves the failure, because the private-
sector resolution is not always feasible. The regulator usually takes P&A-like resolution
policy rather than deposit payos. In such rescue package, the failed bank is sold to another
healthy bank. This rescuing bank usually purchases or assumes the assets and liabilities
of the failed banks with the aid of a subsidy provided by deposit insurance. The subsidy
usually covers the dierence between the market values of the assets and liabilities. Deposit
insurance sometimes purchases part of assets and deposits of the failed bank. Regulators
seek a rescuing bank among candidate banks whose operating area is the same as or adjacent
to the failed bank. Similarly to PCA, the FRS also ameliorates systemic risk if it succeeds
in preventing spillover, provides liquidity, and eventually to isolate banks at default from the
market (Cordella and Yeyati 2003).
2.4. Deposit insurance reforms (DIR)
Deposit insurance is an optimal policy under the circumstance of bank runs as in the
classic work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The Japanese government reformed the deposit
insurance act several times during the crisis. When the blanket guarantee was introduced in
1996, it was scheduled to end in March 2001. In the DIR Act of 2000, its period was extended.3
It nally ended in March 2002 except for settlement accounts. The reform of 2002 enacted
this measure as permanent. During the period of blanket guarantee, the Deposit Insurance
3See Kane and Klingebiel (2004) for the blanket guarantee in the world.
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Corporation of Japan provided the rescuing bank with the amount of funds over the amount
required for deposit payos. 4 When insurance coverage extends to all liabilities, the market
expects that creditors do not incur losses when banks fail at the cost of the regulator and
taxpayers, increasing nancial stability.
2.5. Limitations of regulatory interventions
However, there are many articles that argue the limitations of regulatory interventions.
Among them, the most relevant to our analysis is \too-many-to-fail" problem that induces
banks to herd and thus results in an increased number of failed banks being bailed out
(Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007, 2008). In addition, an ex-post bailout policy may not be
ex-ante optimal, an incidental provision of private information may make market responses
more accentuated to reduce nancial stability, a moral hazard may arise from additional
risk-taking because of higher bailout expectation (Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007, Dam and
Koetter 2012).
Similarly, other measures are also subject to criticism. As argued by Chernykh and Cole
(2015), there is skepticism on the eectiveness of PCA. Peek and Rosengren (1996) nd that
the PCA guidelines on the U.S. banks fail to provide a timely indication of distressed banks.
The FRS scheme may also face the too-many-to-fail issue. The blanket guarantee may also
have adverse eect on systemic risk, because creditors lose incentives to monitor banks and
banks can shift risk onto the insurer (Hovakimian et al. 2003). Deposit insurance increases a
likelihood of banking crisis and government interventions have a negative impact on banking
sector stability (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002, Hryckiewicz 2014).
4The reform of 1997 was somewhat minor. The framework for new mergers and assistance was introduced
but only used for one resolution. The reform of 1998 introduced the receivership of the failed banks, the
establishment of a bridge bank, and the temporary nationalization of failed banks.
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3. Research design
3.1. Methodology
In this subsection, we rst describe the overall methodology for conducting our analyses.
The next subsection briey explains the methodology for estimating CoVaR.5
We measure our systemic risk by delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR), which is the
extended notion of value-at-risk (VaR) frequently and intensively used by nancial institu-
tions (Girardi and Ergun 2013, Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016, Lopez-Espinosa et al. 2012,
Reboredo and Ugolini 2015, 2016).6
The CoVaR on nancial system measures the maximal loss rate of the nancial system
conditional on the event that certain bank suers severe losses beyond the VaR. The delta
CoVaR is the systemic risk contribution of distressed banks, which is dened as the stan-
dardized dierence of the CoVaR between the distress and the normal state. Intuitively,
it captures the risk spillover eects from a distressed bank to the overall nancial system.
Following Girardi and Ergun (2013), the delta CoVaR of the j-th bank at date t is dened
as
CoVaRSjt = 100 (CoVaRSjt   CoVaRSjB;t)=CoVaRSjB;t; (1)
where S denotes nancial system, CoVaRSjt is the CoVaR of the j-th bank in distress,
CoVaRSjB;t is the CoVaR of the j-th bank in the bench mark state. The delta CoVaR repre-
5There are several estimation methods to calculate CoVaR. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) used quantile
regression method, Girardi and Ergun (2013) used the maximum likelihood in DCC GARCHmodel, Reboredo
and Ugolini (2015) proposed CoVaR-copula approach. Among them, we use the maximum likelihood method
in DCC GARCH model.
6Many candidates exist for the systemic risk index. Acharya et al. (2017) propose the systemic expected
shortfall (SES) and marginal expected shortfall (MES). Lopez et al. (2014) propose the CoMargin, which
systematically adjusts collateral requirements on the basis of the CoVaR concept. Huang et al. (2009)
propose the \distress insurance premium" indicator, which measures the expected portfolio loss above the
total liabilities. Lehar (2005) proposes the systemic risk index on the assets and the number of banks measured
as the probability of a systemic crisis. Billio et al. (2012) propose the interconnectedness measure using the
principal component analysis. De Jonghe (2010) proposes tail- measure using extreme value analysis. Each
of these measures has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of CoVaR is that it requires only stock
price data. To save the space, we leave the more detailed overview of systemic risk to articles cited above.
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sents the systemic risk contribution of the distressed bank relative to that of the benchmark
state.
We employ daily data on equity prices from the Nikkei Needs Database. Book value data
are collected from the EoL database and the Nikkei Needs Database. Our baseline regression
equation is dened as
CoVaRSjt = xjt +Djt + uj + vjt; (2)
where xjt is a vector of covariates for bank j on date t, uj is an individual error term, and
vjt is an idiosyncratic error term. Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Lopez-
Espinosa et al. (2012), we examine volatility in the stock market (Tokyo Stock Exchange),
the change in the 10-year JGB rate, two yield spreads, the stock market return (TOPIX),
the call rate, and the reserves on the Bank of Japan account. In addition to these covariate
variables, we include VaR, log of asset size, and leverage of each bank, following Girardi and
Ergun (2013).
The vector of the dummy variable Djt is the set of dummies corresponding to each reg-
ulatory interventions. This variable takes the value of 1 during the corresponding period of
measures taken and 0 otherwise. The event period is 30 days, which starts from the event
date of announcement.
3.2. An estimation methodology for CoVaR
The delta CoVaR is estimated in three steps. In the rst step, we calculate the daily
market return of bank assets using the option pricing formula. In the second step, we estimate
the parameters of the bivariate normal distribution of returns for the nancial system and
each bank by multivariate GARCH model with dynamic conditional correlation (DCC).7 In
7Alternative assumption instead of bivariate normal distribution is the bivariate skewed{t distribution
GARCH of Bauwens and Laurent (2005). We selected the bivariate normal for the following two reasons.
First, unlike VaR, CoVaR conditions on a bad event as shown in Eq. (1). CoVaR focuses on the tail distri-
bution and is more extreme than the unconditional VaR (see the former version of Adrian and Brunnermeier
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the third step, we estimate VaR, CoVaR, and delta CoVaR using the estimated parameters
in the second step.
In the rst step, we calculate market value of asset because the asset VaR is more relevant
when we study the systemic risk. When we use equity VaR, the put option value of deposit
insurance is ignored. Since regulator's intervention aects this put option value in various
points, we use asset VaR instead of equity VaR. The specic procedure of the rst step is as
follows; The gross return of the bank j at date t = (1;   T ) is dened as Rjt = lnPjt lnPj;t 1
, where Pjt is the stock price. We calculate market value of asset VA and asset return Xjt on
the daily basis using Black-Scholes-Merton formula (Merton 1974, 1977). 8 Asset return is
dened as Xjt = lnVAjt   lnVA;j;t 1. We also dene the asset return of nancial system as
XSt = ln
P
j VAjt   ln
P
j VAj;t 1.
The second step is as follows; We assume that each pair of individual asset return and sys-
tem return follows bivariate GARCH model with DCC, Xjt = 
j
t + 
j
t , where X
j
t = (XSt; Xjt)
0
is the j-th pair of asset return vector, jt = 
j
0+
j
1X
j
t 1 is the conditional drift term, 
j
t is the
error term. This error term follows jt = (H
j
t )
1=2jt , where 
j
t follows bivariate i.i.d. joint nor-
mal distribution N(0; I). The conditional covariance matrix of jt dened as Ht = Et 1(
j
t
j0
t )
is decomposed into Ht = D
1=2
t RtD
1=2
t , following Engle (2002). Dt is a diagonal matrix with el-
ement being conditional variance of j-th return 2jt. Rt is time-varying correlation coecient
matrix with 1 on the diagonal and jS;t o the diagonal.
The variance-covariance matrix of jt is modeled as Rt = diag(Qt)
 1=2Qt diag(Qt) 1=2 and
Qt = (1   1   2)R + 1
 
^t 1^0t 1

+ 2Qt 1. The typical element of Qt is qjS;t satisfying
(2016)). Second, according to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), a bivariate diagonal Gaussian GARCH
model produces CoVaR quite similar to the quantile regression method.
8Our method follows the approach used in Vassalou and Xing (2004). Dene risk-free discount rate as
r and the volatility of asset value as A. The method consists of the following six steps. (1): we estimate
Et, standard deviation of Rj ( = t  250;    ; t ) for each t, (2): Substituting this Et as initial value, we
compute VAt using the formula for past 12 months, (3): We estimate At using daily data VAt in (2) for the
past 12 months, (4): Using At in (3), compute VAt using the formula for the past 12 months, (5): We repeat
(3) and (4) until At from two consecutive iterations converge, (6): Using converged At, compute daily VAt
from the formula.
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jS;t = qjSt=
p
qjjtqSSt. ^t 1 is the standardized error dened as D
 1=2
t t. R is quasi-correlation
matrix. 1 and 2 are nonnegative parameters satisfying 0  1 + 2 < 1. The estimates of
jt and variance covariance matrix Ht are obtained by maximal likelihood estimation method.
The third step is as follows; The CoVaR is dened as
Pr

XSt  CoVaRSjt j Xjt  VaRjt

= q (3)
, where q is the condence level. Following Girardi and Ergun (2013), this conditional bivari-
ate normal probability is transformed into joint probability Pr

XSt  CoVaRSjt ; Xjt  VaRjt

=
q2. The benchmark state is dened as the one sigma region around the conditional mean
fjt   jt  Xjt  jt + jtg. The benchmark CoVaR is dened as
Pr

XSt  CoVaRB Sjt ; jt   jt  Xjt  jt + jt

= pjtq (4)
with pjt dened as Pr (jt   jt  Xjt  jt + jt ) = pjt . Finally, delta CoVaR is dened as
in Eq. (1).
3.3. Sample description
Our data sample includes listed banks during the period from April 1995 to March 2004.
In December 2003, the last failure occurred during the Japanese nancial crisis. Our observed
period between 1995 and 2004 was the peak of Japanese nancial crisis with the subsequent
failures and continuous regulatory interventions were announced, therefore, it is meaningful
to study systemic risk issue during this period.
In Table 1, we provide the orderly events of regulatory interventions taken by the regulator
for our sample banks. These events are available in the annual report of the deposit insurance
and are also documented in Shimizu (2009).
|||||||||||||||||||||
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Table 1
|||||||||||||||||||||
4. Empirical analyses on systemic risk and regulatory interventions
4.1. Four types of regulatory interventions and systemic risk
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for CoVaR at the 5% tolerance level by year and
type of regulatory interventions. The sample mean over the full period is 22:6%. The 5 and
95 percentiles are 7:3 and 50:2, respectively. The mean was the highest in 1997. The lower
panel compares the summary statistics by type of interventions. The subsample mean of
interventions is not statistically dierent from that of no interventions. Among each policy,
only the subsample mean of FRS is signicantly smaller than that of no interventions.
|||||||||||||||||||||
Table 2
|||||||||||||||||||||
Table 3 shows the estimation results of equation (2) in four specications when four
dummies are used. In these four specications, we use restricted data where overlapping
observations are dropped. 9 In model (i) and (ii), the xed eects models are estimated
and the heteroscedastic robust standard errors are reported. In model (iii), the estimates
are OLS and the robust standard errors with respect to bank clustering are reported. As a
robustness check to potential endogeneity issue, we estimate the regression equation by GMM
in (iv).10 From these four columns, the coecients of PFI, PCA, and DIR are signicantly
9There are events whose windows were overlapped. Since the numbers of overlapping dates are relatively
small, we simply drop those observations. There are six days overlapping for PFI and PCA, ve days for
PFI and FRS, 31 days for PCA and FRS, three days for PCA and DIR, and 14 days for FRS and DIR. This
appendix table is available upon request from the authors.
10The regulatory intervention is generally considered endogenous. To address this issue, we employ the
instrument variables method of GMM. However, we should point out that the government did not observe
the systemic risk which is the dependent variable, in the past of our sample. The government decides to
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negative. The systemic risk contribution of the distress of a particular bank declines when
the regulator announced PFI, PCA or DIR. In this respect, government capital infusions
lower systemic risk through the provision of liquidity, tend to certify that the recipient banks
are healthy and restore condence. Under PCA announcement, the banks' quick reaction in
response to regulatory announcement could avoid possible systemic disruption. DIR scheme
also promotes nancial stability. However, the coecients of FRS are insignicant. The
possible explanation put forwarded by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) is that it is not
optimal to let surviving banks to purchase failed banks' assets when facing misallocation
cost from liquidation. 11
|||||||||||||||||||||
Table 3
|||||||||||||||||||||
Among the control variables, volatility, yield slope for long maturity, and log of assets
have signicantly positive impacts on CoVaR. The coecients for short maturity yield
spread, VaR, call rate, and log of reserves are signicantly negative. These signs are mostly
consistent with the intuition and the results in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), Lopez-
Espinosa et al. (2012), and Girardi and Ergun (2013). As a robustness check, we conducted
year-by-year estimations, including daily time eects. 12 Although not reported, we found
signicantly negative coecient for PFI in 1999, for PCA in 1999 and 2002, for FRS in 1996
and 2003, and for DIR in 1996 and 1998. This appendix table is available upon request from
the authors.
take a policy, observing only the health of an individual bank. Hence, we considered that the endogeneity
issue is weaker than the usual case where the government decides to intervene by examining the systemic
risk (dependent variable). Nevertheless, this endogeneity issue may be an empirical limitation of our study
if it exists.
11Frankly speaking, the government usually announced the failure and their rescue program simultane-
ously in Japan. This explains why the result of FRS is dierent from others. The market participants
simultaneously received bad news that the bank failed and good news that the bank would be rescued.
12We are grateful for this suggestion made by an anonymous referee.
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4.2. Individual measures of PFIs and systemic risk
The too-many-to-fail guarantees focus on a choice of a group of banks rather than indi-
vidual choices that demonstrate individual too-big-to-fail policy. The fact that banks with
dierent systemic impacts received guarantee or bailout at the same time casts doubt on the
eectiveness of such a bailout policy. Among four policies, some PFI programs had multiple
recipients. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate such heterogeneous eects of PFI to
contrast the eectiveness of too-many-to-fail and individual too-big-to-fail policy.
Table 4 shows the xed eects estimation results with heteroscedastic-robust standard
errors when thirteen individual event dummies are used. There are ve events where the
recipients are multiple (#15, #22, #28, #32, #34). We group three events, #31, #32, and
#33, into one event because their dates are very close. Seven PFI events have signicantly
negative impacts on the systemic risk contribution, consistent with the fact that the ecient
government intervention can succeed if the government focuses on a small number of too-
big-to-fail banks.
However, we nd that event #15 fails to mitigate systemic risk, indicating that the
government bailout policy had a drawback in practice. In this program, the fteen largest
banks that were considered relatively healthy but that had substantial inuence over the
systemic risk applied for the reinforcement of equity capital. 13 This result stresses the
too-many-to-fail problem faced by the Japanese government that the massive bailout induces
other banks to herd and increase the risk that many banks fail together.
|||||||||||||||||||||
Table 4
|||||||||||||||||||||
13The recipients were Daiichi-Kangyo, Fuji, Industrial Bank of Japan, Sanwa, Tokai, Sumitomo, Sakura,
Asahi, Daiwa, Yokohama, and ve trust banks.
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4.3. Spillover eect channels of the PFI
As suggested by Allen and Gale (2000), capital infusion has a direct spillover eect on the
recipient and external eect on other banks, as shown in Figure 1. Direct spillover eect comes
from the fact that capital infusion deters insolvency of the recipient directly whereas external
eect arises because the capital infusion deters a contagion of recipient ’s failure to non-
recipients. The contagion occurs because banks are interdependent through interbank market
transactions (Eisenberg and Noe 2001). In addition, under the multiple lending relationships
prevalent in Japan, the default of large borrower simultaneously damages multiple banks.
Thus, when the government provides liquidity to the recipient, the external eect occurs
between the nancial system and non-recipients. It is argued that the results in the previous
section can be driven by either direct spillover eect, external eect channels, or both. The
last analysis, therefore, aims at detecting these two eect channels in PFI.
|||||||||||||||||||||
Figure 1
|||||||||||||||||||||
Table 5 reports the results. In the rst two columns, the recipient dummy cjt which takes
the value of 1 if j-th bank is the recipient of capital injection program and 0 otherwise is
added to equation (2). This dummy measures the liquidity provision/capital infusion eect,
which is a direct spillover specic to the recipient. The non-recipient dummy Djt measures
an external spillover eect common to all banks. In the last two columns, we disentangle the
event #15 from other PFI events by using dummies specic to this event in the model.
|||||||||||||||||||||
Table 5
|||||||||||||||||||||
According to the column (i) and (ii) of Table 5, we nd that the direct spillover eect
of PFI is signicantly positive whereas external eect is signicantly negative; indicating
15
that liquidity provision of PFI enhances nancial stability via the external eect channel
decreasing a probability of runs, but not via the direct channel.
However, regarding the largest injection program (#15), both coecients for the direct
and external spillover are signicantly positive, consistent with the view that a complete
guaranteed bailout generated moral hazard. A surge in the systemic risk of these rescued
banks triggered an overall increase in systemic risk of their counterparts. This result provides
a deeper understanding for our nding in the previous section that #15 event was dierent
from other rescue packages of PFI in terms of the too-many-to-fail problem due to its direct
and external spillover eect channels. Our evidence strengthens the fact that PFI bailout of
fteen unhealthy banks was beyond the adequacy of regulatory interventions in Japan.
5. Conclusion
In summary, our analyses mostly provide supportive evidence for the liquidity provi-
sion/capital infusion by the government. The results are summarized as follows: (i) the
three types of regulatory interventions (PFI, PCA and DIR) played an important role in
stabilizing systemic risk during the Japanese nancial crisis, (ii) seven individual PFI events
have mitigated systemic risk while one largest PFI event failed, (iii) PFI mostly had a posi-
tive direct spillover eect, but a negative external eect, (iv) however, the largest PFI event
had a positive direct/external spillover eect.
Our paper provides the regulators with the following policy implications. Regarding the
result (i), we should take into account its costs. The bottom line is whether the amount 25
trillion yen that the government paid was worth the price of mitigating systemic risk or not.
The result (ii) warns the way how to provide liquidity to the banks during the nancial
crisis. Given too{big{to{fail concern, the government has to decide at least the timing of
liquidity provision, the amount of liquidity provided, and the number of banks that the gov-
ernment provides liquidity. This result has a policy implication that the ecient government
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intervention can succeed if the government focuses on a small number of too-big-to-fail banks.
In other words, the massive bailout induces other banks to herd and increase the risk that
many banks fail together.
The third result means that the PFI works through decreasing a probability of bank
runs rather than through directly decreasing a probability of default of the PFI recipients.
Therefore, this result has an implication that the government should care how to manage
a surge in the direct spillover eect that ameliorates the systemic risk contribution of the
recipient bank when it provides the liquidity. Practically, this implies that the government
needs devices other than PFI just when it decides to provide liquidity to the recipient.
Basel III revisions proposed the reforms to ensure that all classes of capital instruments
fully absorb losses at the point of non-viability before taxpayers are exposed to loss. Non-
viability becomes a trigger event of a written o of non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments.
Although such a scheme will protect taxpayers’money, it is uncertain whether such a scheme
contributes to stabilizing a nancial system. Our analyses suggest that it is necessary for the
government to aim at calming down systemic risk by a simple regulatory policy rather than
at rescuing all distressed bank.
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